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MILITARY JUSTICE: FROM
OXYMORON TO ASPIRATIONO
BY JANET WALKER, C.D.*
The mandate for Charter-based judicial review of
military law is now in its second decade. Comparative
analysis of the relationship between military law and
the civilian judiciary in common law countries reveals
that Canadian courts benefitting from this mandate are
so placed within the constitutional structure as to be
uniquely able to engage in substantive review of the
adherence to the principles of fundamental justice by
Canadian courts martial. Accordingly, the question of
the jurisdiction of military tribunals which has formed
the focal point internationally for judicial review is of
passing significance in Canada. The yet critical issues
of civilian appellate review and judicial independence
can be and are being addressed directly in Canada. In
1990, the Court Martial Appeal Court, labouring under
a constitutionally inadequate jurisdiction of its own,
struck down the most common form of court
martial-the Standing Court Martial-triggering
legislative reform that created the first truly
independent military judiciary. Similar challenges to
the constitutionality of the General Court Martial
succeeded in the 1992 Supreme Court decisions in
Ginbreux and Forater, which confirmed in principle the
adequacy of the amendments to the structure of the
courts martial and the justifiability of the remaining
differences from civilian judicial processes.
Le mandat de faire une revue judiciaire du droit
militaire base sur It Charte est entr6 dans sa deuxi~me
d6cennie. L'analyse comparatif du rapport entre le
droit militaire et le pouvoir judiciaire civil dans les pays
de la common law d6montre que les cours canadiennes,
profitant de ce mandat, sont situ6es dans la structure
constitutionnelle de sorte qu'elles possadent
uniquement la capacit6 de faire une revue substantive
de l'adh6sion de la cour aux principes. Par cons6quent,
la question de la juridiction des tribunaux militaires, qui
est devenue le sujet de la revue judiciaire au niveau
international, est d'une importance passagtre au
Canada. On est capable et en train d'aborder les
questions critiques de la revue d'appel civile et de
rind6pendance judiciaire au Canada. En 1990, la Cour
d'appel de la cour martiale du Canada, charg6e de sa
propre juridiction constitutionellement inad6quate, a
annul6 la plus commune forme de la cour martiale, lI
cour martiale permanente, et provoqu6 de la r6forme
16gislative cr6ant premiere organization judiciaire
militaire d'une ind6pendance r6elle. Des d6fis
comparables A Ia constituionnalit6 de la Cour Gyn6rale
ont r6ussi dans Gdnireux et Forster, dcisions de la
Cour Supr8me en 1992, qui ont alrm6 en principe les
modifications structurelles de la cour martiale et la
16gitimation des autres 616ments qui distinguent la cour
des procedures judiciaires civiles.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MILITARY LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW
We are fortunate in Canada to have enjoyed long-standing
security from armed attack. We attribute this, in part, to our peaceful
nature. Accordingly, we look upon matters of national defence with
both a degree of complacency and uneasy ambivalence. However, our
prominent role in peace-keeping has underscored the importance of the
contribution made by our armed forces to the international rule of law.
Effective armed forces depend, inter alia, upon the maintenance
of standards of conduct among their members distinct from those of
ordinary citizens. The maintenance of these standards, it has been
thought, requires a specialized judicial system. Therefore, although the
rule of law requires that everyone be subject to ordinary laws
administered by ordinary tribunals, it is thought that those engaged in
the defence of the rule of law should be subject to a distinct law
administered by distinct tribunals. As one American writer noted, "It is
one of the ironies of patriotism that a man who is called to the military
service of his country may anticipate not only the possibility of giving up
his life but also the certainty of giving up his liberties."1 This irony
would be tragic if the liberties denied members of the armed forces were
I R. Sherrill, Military Justice Is to Justice as Military Music is to Music (Toronto: Fitzhenry &
Whiteside, 1969) at 1.
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not merely those incidental to civlian life, but more basic liberties that
were forfeited in a judicial process that violated the principles underlying
the rule of law they are sworn to defend.
In this way, the growing commitment in Canada and elsewhere in
recent decades to the fairness of the criminal justice system has fuelled
concern that a parallel system of justice, administered by members of the
military who are aware of and sensitive to its military context,2 may be Ri
equipped to afford defendants the degree of fairness they would enjoy in
ordinary civilan courts. "This concern has gained a sense of urgency with
the establishment of constitutional guarantees under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 that apply to "everyone." 4 Therefore,
despite ambivalence concerning the role of the armed forces, there
should be no complacency over the need for fairness in the Canadian
military justice system. That system is charged with the responsibility of
safeguarding the rights of those who, in defending the rule of law,
deserve, no less than other citizens, to benefit from it.
The first decade of Charter jurisprudence was marked by
sweeping changes in Canadian military law. These changes culminated
in the 1992 Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Gin6reux. The
Court found that the structure of the court martial in which the
appellants were convicted had violated their rights under s. 11(d) to a
trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, in a way that could not be
justified in a free and democratic society.5 With the offending provisions
in its governing legislation declared of no force and effect, the military
court of general jurisdiction was rendered inoperative until the necessary
amendments were made. Despite the apparent drama of this event, it
was only one of many significant developments that have resulted in the
establishment of arguably the fairest military justice system anywhere.
This article seeks to place these developments in their historical
and constitutional contexts. Part II examines the trend of the 1950s and
1960s in common law countries to establish civilian appellate review of
2 See R v. Gn re=, [199211 S.C.R. 259.
3 Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada.Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
4 Section 7 of the Charter reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice" [emphasis added]. "Everyone" has been held to include every person
physically present in Canada and thereby under Canadian law. see generally, Singh v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
5 Gndreux, supra note 2 [hereinafter Ginereux (S.C.C.)]. Section 11 of the Charter reads:
"Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (d) to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
1994]
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military proceedings; it contains a comparative analysis of civilian
appellate review as it exists in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada, assessing the degree to which it has succeeded in bringing
civilian standards of fairness to bear on military proceedings. Part III
traces the rise and fall of the jurisdictional solution sought in the 1970s
and 1980s to the questions of fairness in military tribunals. Part IV
considers the crystallization of the principal concern with the fairness of
a parallel system of justice into the concern for judicial independence
and the jurisprudential developments prompted by this concern. Part V
reviews the culmination of these developments in the 1992 Supreme
Court of Canada decisions which established the first formally
independent military judiciary.
II. CIVILIAN APPELLATE REVIEW
The first major development in the evolving fairness of courts
martial in recent decades occurred in the early 1950s when the United
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all
moved to establish civilian courts of appeal from military tribunals. It
was then thought that civilian appellate review was the key to ensuring
standards of fairness in military courts commensurate with those of
civilian tribunals. In its absence, review of court martial decisions was
limited both in its availability and its scope by the constraints of the
prerogative writs. As one historian observed, with "surprising unanimity,
the common law world concluded virtually at the same moment in time
that, just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so military
justice is too vital to be entrusted to judge advocates. ' '6 The striking
coincidence in the timing of the introduction of civilian courts of military
appeal and the similarity in the extent of their jurisdictions7 can be
contrasted with their varying degrees of success in influencing the
evolution of procedural fairness in military tribunals.
6 F.B. Weiner, Civilians Under Military Justice" The British Practice Since 1689, Especially In
North America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) at 232.
7 They cannot review findings of fact, nor can they vary the sentence of the trial court.
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A. The United States Court of Military Appeals
The United States Court of Military Appeals (uSCMA)8 is the
senior U.S. military appellate court9 and is composed of five civilian
judges' 0 appointed for a term of fifteen years by the President with
confirmation by the Senate. Since its inception, the uscMA and its
predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals (coMA), has identified itself
with federal appellate courts, and since 1960, the Court has held "that
the protections in the Bill of Rights,11 except those which are expressly or
by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of ...
[the] armed forces." 12 The efforts to enhance the fairness of court
martial proceedings, first of coMA and later of the usCMA, have included
striking down Army Manual provisions held to impose "cruel and
unusual punishment," and attempts to establish the right to counsel in
summary proceedings. At times, the rulings of the uscMA have been so
bold as to invoke the restraining hand of the U.S. Supreme Court.13
8 The original name of this court was "comA" (The Court of Military Appeals)-the "U.S."
was added to make "it clear that the Court of Military Appeals is a court and does have the power
to question ... any executive regulation or action as freely as though it were a court constituted
under article IH of the Constitution": House of Representatives Report No.1481, 90th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 2 (1968), as found in NMCMR v. Carlucci, 26 MJ. 328 (U.S.C.M.A. 1988) (Lexis No. 1653)
[hereinafter Carlucci].
9 The uscmA operates in addition to formal appellate courts within each of the services that
are empowered to review matters of both law and fact: R.S. Thompson, "Constitutional
Applications to the Military Criminal Defendant" (1989) 66 U. Det. L Rev. 221. (The differences in
scale between Canadian and American jurisprudence on any given question make the recent
developments all the more remarkable for being in advance of those in the U.S.)
10 This was increased from three by the 1989 Congressional Amendments to the Uniform Code
of lditary Justice: DA. Schleuter, Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure, 2nd ed. 1990
Cumulative Supplement (Charlottesvile, VA- Michie, 1990) at 137.
11 U.S. Const.
12 U.S. v.Jacoby, (1960) 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428 29:244 [footnote added]. This laudable objective
has been impeded, in part, by a lack of awareness and education on the part of practitioners,
resulting from a pronounced divergence between the American civil and military bars. See E.R.
Fidell, "The Culture of Change in Military Law" (1989) 126 Mil. L Rev. 125 [hereinafter "The
Culture of Change"]. In 1982 the American Bar Association, in its efforts to remedy this situation
and to align court martial procedure with civilian criminal procedure, published a comparative
analysis: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Military Practice and Procedure.
13 The 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S.Ct. 1281 (1976)
[hereinafter MiddendorA], explicitly overruled an earlier COMA ruling which stated that assigned
counsel must be available to a summary court martial defendant when there was a possibility of
confinement. The coiA response of restricting the summary court martial to minor offences of an
exclusively military nature was also later vacated: J.B. Jacobs, The Socio-LegalFoundations of Civil-
Military Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986) at 8.
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Advocates of enhanced rights for defendants in military tribunals have
felt that "[m]ore than any other institution, coMA placed the military's
system of social control under the rule of law."
14
The significance of the uscMA's approach to its mandate and its
strong commitment to constitutional standards in military courts is best
appreciated in light of the broader context of constitutional
jurisprudence shaped by the "political questions" doctrine which held
military law to be non-justiciable in civilian courts.15 This sharp division
in the American Constitution between the spheres of influence of the
executive and the judiciary underlying the political questions doctrine
has fuelled lingering controversy over the application of the Bill of Rights
to military tribunals, despite the extensive jurisprudence in the civilian
courts based on the Bill of Rights.
16
In contrast, no such impediment to judicial review exists in
Canada according to a concurring decision in Operation Dismantle Inc. v.
The Queen17 where Wilson J. held that matters of national defence were
justiciable in civilian courts, and that the court below had erred in
following both U.K. precedents, which suggested that defence policy was
not "a matter for judge or jury, s18 and U.S. precedents based on the
political questions doctrine, which she cited as a "well established
principle of American constitutional law."19 It was wrong to conclude,
Wilson J. stated, that such matters "involve moral and political
considerations ... not within the province of the courts to assess." 20
Matters of the executive branch, she explained, are subject to judicial
review in Canada because "there is no reason in principle to distinguish
between cabinet decisions made pursuant to statutory authority and
those made in the exercise of the royal prerogative."21 Clearly, the
14 Jacobs, ibl at 6-7. Also, "[s]ince its creation in 1951, the United States Court of Military
Appeals has made great strides in creating the beginning of a legitimate jurisprudence in the field of
substantive military law": LC. West, They Call it Justice: Command Influence and the Court-Martial
System (New York. Viking, 1977) at 283.
15 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16 See supra note 12.
17 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 [hereinafter Operation Dismantle].
18 Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] 3 All E.R. 142 (H.L) at 151.
19 Operation Dismantle, supra note 17 at 467.
20 Ibd. at 465.
21 Ibid at 464. Strong support for judicial review of Canadian military law is to be found in
the unusual relationship created by the Canadian Constitution between the various "branches" of
government. As Hogg explained in a pre-Charter discussion, "There is no general 'separation of
powers' in the [Brtish North America] Act. The Act does not separate the legislative, executive and
[VOL 32 NO. 1
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presence or absence of a constitutional constraint such as that created by
the political questions doctrine can have a significant impact on the
application of constitutional standards to military courts.
B. The UK Courts Martial Appeal Court
Different kinds of constraints, in particular, the lack of civilian
standards of procedural fairness that come with the participation of
personnel trained in civilian law in military proceedings, and the absence
of explicit constitutional standards, have rendered civilian appellate
review in the United Kingdom more conservative. Emphasis has been
placed on internal military/administrative avenues of appeal that "are
much more extensive than in the civilian courts and have been developed
to counter-balance a system that relies to a great extent on the services
of lay persons to administer justice."22 In fact, it has been argued on
behalf of the internal military procedures that "the military experience
demonstrates the essential fact that free access to appellate review is an
indispensable feature of an enlightened system of criminal justice."23
Despite the fact that free access to appellate review may be of genuine
practical benefit, especially in less formal disciplinary proceedings, the
absence of constitutionally guaranteed standards as a basis for that
review coupled with procedural limitations on its availability,24 casts
judicial functions and insist that each branch of government exercise only 'its own' function": P.W.
Hogg, The Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 129. The implication of this
arrangement is that there are no impediments to the conferral of judicial functions on "bodies
which are not courts" and the mandate to exercise non-judicial or "advisory" powers by the courts
(an example is the procedure by which proposed legislation is referred to the courts for a
determination of its constitutionality before being passed into law): ibU at 129-30. Therefore, the
integration between the various branches of government has long supported the military tribunals'
performance of judicial functions and the civilian courts' appellate review of military law. This
principle has been affirmed in the Supreme Court of Canada decisions regarding the competence of
administrative tribunals to consider and apply the Charter in their proceedings: DouglaslKwanten
Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, citing Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations
Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455.
22 PJ. Rowe, Defence: The Legal Implications (Military Law and the Laws of War) (London:
Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987) at 22.
23 Ibd at 23. Rowe concluded, at 23, "The importance of the Court-Martial Appeal Court
lies not only in the fact that it provides a means by which an accused can argue that his conviction
was wrong, but it also enables a civilian court to oversee the military legal system."
24 These procedural limitations include the absence of an appeal as of right to the Courts
Martial Appeal Court, the absence of a right of appeal for those tried by summary means, the
availability of appeal only for those convicted who have petitioned and been rejected by the
Defence Council, and the inability of the Courts Martial Appeal Court to review the sentence.
1994]
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some doubt on its ability to enhance the fairness of court martial
proceedings.
In the absence of greater assurances within the U.K. military
justice system, it is encouraging to note that the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2 5 contains
provisions that have been applied to European military tribunals.2 6
However, as Rowe explains, the European Convention
is not a part of the law of England and any divergence between its requirements and
English law can only be considered under the machinery established by the Convention.
It is not therefore open to a soldier who has been sentenced to detention by his
commanding officer to argue that the sentence is invalid because it conflicts with Article
5 of the Convention since he has been deprived of his liberty other than by a 'competent'
court.27
Human rights issues arising in English penal proceedings, including
issues of procedural justice in military courts, cannot be addressed within
the course of those proceedings, but only upon a separate appeal to the
European Court with all the attendant logistical and financial barriers.
Therefore, any concerns regarding the collateral or indirect influence of
appellate review on the fairness of the proceedings at first instance apply
a fortiori to the influence of the European Convention on the British
military justice system.
C. The Canadian Court MartialAppeal Court
The Canadian Court Martial Appeal Court (cMAc), comprised of
three judges of either the Federal Court or the provincial superior
courts, is the civilian appellate court that hears appeals from Canadian
courts martial. The combined effect of the constitutional relationship
between the various branches of government and the Charter grants the
cMAC arguably the broadest authority to engage in judicial review of
military law known to common law jurisdictions. As already noted,
Canadian civilian courts are not impeded in their review of military law
by strong constitutional divisions between the executive and the judiciary
25 4 November 1950, Eur. T.S. 5,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
2 6 In 1976, the European Court applied article 5 of the European Convention (which prohibits
the deprivation of liberty except if it had been imposed by a "competent court") to military
tribunals, thereby implying that military tribunals should be treated as courts interpreting law: Engel
and Others, Eur. Crt. H.R. Ser. A, No. 22, Judgment of 8 June 1976 [hereinafter Engel].
27 Rowe, supra note 22 at 25. The "competent court" requirement in the European
Convention is roughly comparable to the Canadian Charter s. 11(d) requirement for an "impartial
and independent" tribunal: supra note 5.
[VOL 32 NO. I
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as exist under the American Constitution. Also, as already noted,
compared with the civilian appellate review in the U.K., Canadian courts
now benefit by conducting their review according to formal
constitutional standards 28 However, the Canadian cMAc has been slow
to realize its potential in exercising this authority. In an article written
before the advent of the Charter, but after the enactment of the
Canadian Bill of Rights,29 Starkman referred to the supervisory role
played by Canadian civilian courts in military law as "the fountain of
ambiguity"30 and, as recently as 1988, the courts were observed to "have
charted a course of deference to the military's own assessment of what is
necessary to the effective functioning of the Forces."3'
If the pre-Charter jurisprudence of the CMAC was deferential,
then its Charter jurisprudence of the 1980s may best be described as
diffident. This diffidence can be attributed both to the changing
standards for civilian penal process and to the uncertainty of the CMAC
about its own jurisdiction as a 'competent' court for the purposes of
section 24(1) of the Charter32 to fashion remedies for Charter violations.
28 Section 52(1) of the Charter reads: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
2 9 S.C 1960, c. 44.
3 0 B. Starkman, "Canadian Military Law: The Citizen as Soldier" (1965) 43 Can. Bar Rev. 414
at 442.
3 1 A. Heard, "Military Law and the Charter of Rights" (1987-88) 11 Dalhousie LU. 514 at 535.
3 2 All in all, until quite recently, its record as a defender of constitutional standards has been
disappointing. The results of appeals launched on the basis of two types of Charter challenges
illustrate this. In the first of two cases to address the constitutionality of statutorily imposed limits
on caAc powers to vary the time limit for the submission of an appeal, R. v. F/neing (1984), 4
C.M.A.R. 328 at 330, it was held that the CMAC lacked the discretionary scope of civilian appellate
courts: specifically, "the Court being without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal commenced out of
time and powerless, itself; to extend that time, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, nor can
the Court ignore its lack of jurisdiction." Also rejected was a premature s. 15 equality claim (made
on the basis that the charge was one in which the civilian courts had concurrent jurisdiction). The
appellant had argued that he ought to benefit from judicial discretionary powers equal to those
available to civilian appellate courts. The argument failed because s. 15 had not yet come into force.
Unfortunately, in a subsequent decision regarding the same relief, the appellant had failed to
comply with the deadline prescribed (in an extension granted without comment) and so was denied
an appeal without the reasons addressing the constitutionality of allegedly discriminatory limitations
of cMAc jurisdiction: R. v. McCulough, (1988) 5 C.MA.L 3.
The second type of challenge, concerning the constitutionality of the inability of the cm.Ac to
review the severity of the sentence, has been the focus of two appeals arising from convictions for
impaired driving in Germany. In the first, the court questioned its own jurisdiction to address an
alleged violation of the s. 12 protection against "cruel and unusual treatment" because it has no
jurisdiction to review the severity of the sentence. Nevertheless, the CMAC ruled that the reduction
in rank, automatically following any sentence of imprisonment (in this case thirty days), was not
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
As will be examined later, once the civilian jurisprudence applicable to
the constitutional questions faced by courts martial took shape, this
diffidence gave way to the setting of high standards for fairness in
military courts.
m. JURISDICTION
Although essential to a fair military justice system, civilian
appellate review gradually ceased to be regarded as being sufficient to
ensure procedural fairness in courts martial. The availability of judicial
review simply was not enough when it seemed inevitable that the
constitutional rights of defendants in courts martial would be
circumscribed in the name of military necessity. In an era of growing
interest in formal equality and civil rights, explicit statutory concurrency
of jurisdiction such as that created by section 130 of the National Defence
Act, providing for military trials of criminal offences, led many to
question the jurisdiction of courts martial to try service members for
crimes which could be tried in ordinary courts. If the military context
restricted the ability of the court martial to provide adequate procedural
safeguards, then perhaps its jurisdiction should in turn be limited to
offences arising solely in that context. The similarity in the conditions of
peace time military service and civilian employment, and the proximity
of military bases to civilian communities, contribute to the view that
military service is an "occupation" rather than an "institution,"33 and
cruel or unusual because all service personnel had agreed to be bound by the National Defence Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, and all were liable to suffer the punishment upon receiving a sentence of
imprisonment: R v. Vaillancourt (1985), 4 C.M.A.R. 344. In the second case, R. v. Oliver, (1988) 4
C.MA.R. 559 at 561, where it was reviewing a conviction for impaired driving which prescribed a
sentence of twenty months, the CMAC held that it was
neither a court with inherent jurisdiction nor a court of first instance. The absence of a
right to appeal severity of sentence to this Court was not in issue at trial and it is not,
therefore, a matter upon which the Court Martial may be said to have erred. The severity
of the sentence is not before us; the law, as it presently stands, precludes that.
Accordingly, any pronouncement we might make as to the constitutionality of that law
would not be a decision of a legal question properly before us.
One might well wonder, in the light of the current mood of assertiveness of the CMAC, how
long it will continue to evade such serious Charter issues by citing its modest mandate.
33 Roughly speaking, the "occupational" model views service members as ordinary citizens
employed by the military, and the "institutional" model "insists that there is a distinct military
calling and status that make the business of arms different from civilian occupations": D.N. Zillman,
"Military Criminal Jurisdiction in the United States" (1990) 20 U.W. Australia L Rev. 6 at 32. See
also C.C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization" (1977) 4
Armed Forces & Society 41.
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that courts martial should function more like professional discipline
tribunals than courts of law.
On a more pragmatic note, the broad concurrency of court
martial jurisdiction over civilian offences and the well-established
remedy of judicial review for jurisdictional error provided a rich
opportunity for further litigation by losing defendants. Having thereby
become the most common ground for challenges to the decisions of
courts martial, the question of jurisdiction often served only as a vehicle
to address other issues raised by a parallel system of justice.3 4 In this
3 4 In one notable exception, a genuine complaint against concurrency of jurisdiction (the risk
of double jeopardy) came to the fore in Australia as a result of a tug-of-war between civilian and
military authorities over impaired driving defendants. In Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989), 63
A.LJ.R. 250, a majority of the High Court found invalid provisions of the Defence Force Discipline
Act 1982 (Cth) preventing a civil court from re-trying a person for substantially the same offence for
which he had been acquitted or convicted by a service tribunal or for an offence that had been taken
into consideration in relation to a convicted person. The High Court held these provisions
unconstitutional because they ousted the jurisdiction of the state courts, but it permitted the
common law principles of double jeopardy, as they had developed in each state, to continue to
apply. see R.A. Brown, "The Line Between Military and Civil Justice in Australia" (1989) 63 A.L.J.
666. In "Military Justice in Australia: W(h)ither Away? The Effects of Re Tracey, Ex parte Ryan"
(1989) 13 Crim. L.J. 263 at 287, R.A. Brown charted the significant risk of double jeopardy that
persists in a variety of situations in different Australian states through the unevenness of the
common law on the subject. He speculated, at 287, that "the service authorities may, in fairness to
the accused, be effectively compelled to wait until the relevant civilian prosecutorial authorities
decide whether they will prosecute the matter before invoking service proceedings, thereby
effectively destroying one of the principal values of military justice, its speed."
Then, in McWaters v. Day, [1990] 64 A.L.J.R. 41, when the military reasserted its jurisdiction in
a successful challenge to the competence of the civilian state court to try a serviceman also liable to
military proceedings, the High Court of Australia granted special leave to appeal and overturned
the decision unanimously. The Court held, at 43, that paramountcy could not be invoked on behalf
of military jurisdiction through the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 because the legislation
"contemplates parallel systems of military and ordinary criminal law and does not evince any
intention that defence force members enjoy an absolute immunity from liability under the ordinary
criminal law." One commentator, J.G. Starke, in "Constitutional Law and Defence--Alleged
inconsistency between Commonwealth defence force discipline legislation and State criminal
law-Whether two systems parallel so that s. 109 of the Constitution does not apply" (1990) 64
A.L.J. 299 at 300, suggested that "[i]f this has not already been done, perhaps Guidelines agreed to
by both, should set out criteria to govern the matter of selection of the most appropriate tribunal."
In Canada, such cooperation between civilian and military authorities is cited by KW. Watkin
in Canadian Military Justice: Summary Proceedings and the Charter (LL.M. Thesis: Queen's
University, 1990) [unpublished] at 104-05, as important in addition to safeguards against double
jeopardy:
While theoretically such overlapping [of jurisdictions] has the potential to create a
problem, in practice, conflict is avoided by liaison between the civilian and military
authorities. In addition, policies are in place that require certain offences, such as
impaired driving, to be dealt with by the civilian criminal justice system. These policies
are followed even in cases where the nexus approach would result in a clear military
jurisdiction. Similarly, jurisdiction is often waived by civilian authorities in order to allow
the military to commence disciplinary action.
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way, review for jurisdictional error was derivative in two senses: it
enabled the appellant to challenge the conviction; and it allowed the
reviewing court to examine the fairness of court martial procedure in
greater detail. Thus, although review pursued through the prerogative
orders required complaints to be framed as jurisdictional challenges, the
results of these applications for judicial review often reflected the court's
appraisal of the fairness of the proceedings under review and the merit
of the complaint lodged against them more than they did a strict
determination of whether the defendant was properly before the court.
As Starkman suggested in 1965, "the courts have used (and at times
misused) the concept of jurisdiction as an instrument of policy."35 When
military justice was viewed as unduly harsh or objectionable, its
jurisdiction was construed narrowly, and when it met current standards,
civilian courts refrained from interference through a generous
construction of court martial jurisdiction. That the elasticity of the issue
permitted significant civilian judicial discretion to engage in a kind of
review of military law otherwise beyond its jurisdiction is amply
illustrated by the American jurisprudence.
A. The "Service Connection" Test and the "Military Nexus" Doctine
The first major decision to limit "court martial jurisdiction over
the core group subject to the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice],
active duty service personnel,"3 6 was that of O'Callahan v. Parker.37
Having exhausted the appeals available within the military justice
system, O'Callahan applied through the civilian system and ultimately to
the U.S. Supreme Court for habeas corpus. He questioned the
jurisdiction of the military to try "a crime cognizable in a civilian court
and having no military significance, alleged to have been committed off-
post and while on leave."38 The Court's finding that the army did not
have jurisdiction to try O'Callahan was significant because the challenge
had been launched on the explicitly constitutional basis that courts
35 Supra note 30 at 442.
3 6 See Zillman, supra note 33 at 15. Previous determinations of jurisdiction were confined to
more dubious subjects for court martial: civilians resisting conscription (Billings v. Tuesdell, 321
U.S. 542 (1944)); ex-servicemen, honourably discharged (U.S.A. ExRel Toth v. Quarks, 350 U.S. 11
(1950) [hereinafter Toth]); families of those serving abroad (Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)); and
civilian employees serving abroad (Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)).
37395 U.S. 258 (1969) [hereinafter O'Callahan].
38 IbI& at 261.
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martial deprived O'Callahan of his rights to grand jury indictment and
trial by petit jury as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the Bill of Rights. The U.S. Supreme Court held that court martial
jurisdiction should be construed narrowly as the court was "not yet an
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved."3 9 Further, the Court held that "as an institution [courts
martial] are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subleties [sic] of
constitutional law."'40 Unable to apply constitutional standards directly
to the court martial, the Supreme Court restricted its jurisdiction by
requiring that for "the crime to be under military jurisdiction [it] must be
service connected." 41 The "service connection" test developed, in the
jurisprudence of the coMA, into a review of the twelve "Relford
Factors"42 which continued to be the basis for determining court martial
jurisdiction for some seventeen years.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the only
challenge to military law ever to reach it based on the Canadian Bill of
Rights. Although the majority dismissed the appeal, satisfied with the
fairness of courts martial procedure, McIntyre J. showed some sympathy
with the claim that military defendants charged with criminal offences
should benefit from safeguards present in civilian criminal procedure. In
a concurring decision, he held that, when concurrency of jurisdiction
exists, a military tribunal should be permitted to try only offences
"committed by a serviceman if such offence is so connected with the
service in its nature, and in the circumstances of its commission, that it
would tend to affect the general standard of discipline and efficiency of
the service." 43 Following this decision, the elusive "military nexus"
3 9 Ibid. at 265.
4 0 
bid.
4 Ilbid. at 272.
42 The "Relford Factors" are found in Relford v. Commandan4 U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401
U.S. 355 (1971) [hereinafter Relford].
43 MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370 [hereinafter MacKay] at 410. The majority
decision, written by Ritchie J., viewed military law as the equal of civilian law and held that military
defendants enjoyed advantages equal to their civilian counterparts. Accordingly, they could not
complain that the jurisdiction of military tribunals was based on their status as members of the
Canadian Forces. Despite the fact that this was the majority's decision, the CMAC followed the
moderate approach of McIntyre . (possibly because of the strong dissent of Laskin CJ., who
argued for caution vis-d-vis military tribunals which he viewed as having insufficient judicial
independence to be the equals of their civilian counterparts). See Watkin, supra note 34 at 95-98.
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doctrine developed.44 While its similarity to the American "service
connection" doctrine suggested that it was "borrowed" 45 from the
American model, the CmAC rejected the "Relford Factors" as a guide to
its application insisting instead that "each case should be considered
according to its particular circumstances." 46 The resulting uncertainty,47
coupled with the significant enhancements in procedural fairness
enacted in 1985 as a result of the Charter-based amendments to the
National Defence Act,48 ultimately cast doubt on the validity of this
approach to court martial jurisdiction.
B. The Emergence of a "Status Only" Test
During the period when the "service connection" test marked
the limits of court martial jurisdiction, a variety of factors began to
weaken the resolve of U.S. courts "to restrict military tribunals to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among troops in active service." 49 These factors included "the
extension of procedural and substantive rights to service personnel ... a
shifting of emphasis from criminal to administrative law ... [and] a
reemphasis on the contractual nature of military service."50 In addition,
the 1983 congressional grant of authority to the U.S. Supreme Court to
44P. v. MacDonald (1984), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 551 (C.M.A.C.); R v. Catuda/(1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d)
189 (C.M.A.C.); R v. MacEachem (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 439 (C.M.A.C.) [hereinafter
MacEachern]; R. v. Sullivan (1986), 65 N.R. 48 (C.M.A.C.); and R v. lonson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1073.
Worth noting is that "military nexus" and, indeed, the question of jurisdiction have not been at issue
in challenges raised by those subject to military law abroad. One explanation for this may be that
the alternative to a court martial convened outside Canada is not a Canadian court, but a local
court, which defendants may not prefer.
45 Watkin, supra note 34 at 97.
46 MacEaczern, supra note 44 at 443.
4 7 Heard, supra note 31 at 538-41.
4 8 The following are examples of amendments to the National Defence Act found in Statute
Law (The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) AmendmentAct R.S.C. 1985 1st Supp., c. 31, ss.
42-61: s. 66 protects those tried by military tribunals against double jeopardy resulting from retrial
by civilian tribunals; s. 151 incorporates all common law excuses and justifications into any
proceedings under the Code of Service Discipline; s. 156 eliminates provisions for the arrest or
detention without a warrant of a person "about to commit" an offence; s. 158 provides for pre-trial
release; s. 159 requires a speedy trial; s. 163 prohibits the same person from acting as both the
investigating officer and the trier of fact; s. 248 provides for release pending appeal; and s. 273
specifies the conduct of searches.
49 Toth, supra note 36 at 22.
5 0 Jacobs, supra note 13 at 5.
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review all uscMA decisions directly5l brought the matter squarely within
its purview52 In 1987, in its first opportunity to exercise its newly
granted mandate, the U.S. Supreme Court replaced the service
connection test with a "status only" test for court martial jurisdiction.53
C. The Underlying Issue: 'Are Courts Martial Courts of Law?"
Although the courts, through jurisdictional challenges, have
addressed a variety of issues otherwise beyond review, one of these
issues-that of whether military law is law and whether military courts
are courts-has since become crucial to the continued existence of the
court martial. The changing sociological context aside, the uneasy
rapport between the uscMA and the U.S. Supreme Court can in large
part be attributed to an ongoing debate over the status of the court
martial itself. The restraining hand of the Supreme Court referred to
earlier was exercised in Middendorf in response to the coMA ruling which
stated that assigned counsel must be available to a summary court
martial defendant when there is a possibility of confiement.54 The
Supreme Court's reasons for that response had been that the summary
court-martial was more like an administrative proceeding than a criminal
trial.55
Needless to say, much has happened since Middendorf to shape
the judicial appraisal of courts martial. The first indication of an
evolving understanding of the nature of the court martial came soon
after Middendorf, but from more distant quarters. In 1976, the
European Court of Human Rights held in Engels 6 that article 5 of the
51 For a summary of the avenues of appellate review in the U.S. military justice system, see
J.11 Baum & K.J. Barry, "United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carducci: A
Question of Judicial Independence" (1989) 36 Fed. Bar News & J. 242 at note 1.
52 It is worth noting the effect of the intervening changes in the make-up of the Supreme
Court bench. The three members of the Court who had participated in the decisions of O'Ca!/ahan,
supra note 37, or Re/ford, supra note 42 (the decisions that formulated the "service connection" test
for court martial jurisdiction), Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, dissented in the Solorio
decision, inf&a note 53 (which instituted the "status only" test for court martial jurisdiction).
53 U.S. v. Solorio, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). The mandate for review was granted in the Mditay
JusticeAct of 1983,10 U.S.C. § 801.
54 See Jacobs, supra note 13 at 5-10.
55 See dissents of Marshall and Brennan JJ. at 1293-1305, supra note 13. It is not clear
whether this suggested a sharp contrast with other forms of court martial or whether it indicated a
general distinction between military and criminal proceedings.
56 Supra note 26.
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European Convention prohibiting the deprivation of liberty except if it
had been imposed by a competent court applied to military tribunals.
This meant that the reduced procedural standards applicable to
administrative or disciplinary proceedings were inadequate to justify the
exercise of authority to impose penal consequences. The Supreme
Court of Canada eventually took this approach in the 1987 decision in)?.
v. Wigglesworth5 7 and extended the section 11(h)58 Charter protection
from double jeopardy to cover situations arising from the concurrent
jurisdiction between the Criminal Code59 and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police Act.60 The guarantee was held to apply to any
proceeding having "true penal consequences" or that was "by nature"
criminal even if it was "intended to maintain discipline, professional
integrity and professional standards." 61 The Charter guarantees found in
sections 7 to 14 were available in these proceedings because persons
"subject to penal consequences such as imprisonment-the most severe
deprivation of liberty known to our law- ... should be entitled to the
highest procedural protection known to our law."62
This functional approach to the problems of procedural fairness
and jurisdiction precludes the disciplinary purpose of a parallel system of
justice within the military from justifying a narrow construction of either
the scope of the court martial or its procedural obligations to defendants
before it. Since restrictions in either area would prejudice the parties
before a court martial, and because current standards require a
proportionate relationship between jurisdiction and process, the
Wigglesworth approach to courts martial as de facto courts has enabled
direct consideration of the requirements for the court martial to stand as
an integral part of a parallel system of justice.
57 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 [hereinafter Wiggleswornh].
58 Section 11 reads: "Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (h) if finally
acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the
offence, not to be tried or punished for it again."
5 9 R.S.C. 1986, c. C46.
60 R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10.
61 Wigglesworth, supra note 57 at 559-62.
62 Ib. at 562. Accordingly, the "Legal Rights" found in the Charter should be guaranteed not
only in the prosecution of offences over which the military has concurrent jurisdiction with civilian
courts by way of s. 130 of the National Defence Act, but also in the prosecution of all offences save
those which represent "distinct delicts, causes or matters." (See Wigglesworth, supra note 57). For
example, a penal sentence for "stealing" under the National Defence Act should preclude civilian
proceedings for "theft" under the Criminal Code. (Double jeopardy protection is available both
through the 1985 amendments of the National DefenceAct and through s. 11(h) of the Chater.)
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IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Arguably the greatest challenge to the fairness of the court
martial is that posed by the requirement of judicial independence. The
issue of independence is complicated from the start by the fact that the
court martial members are drawn from within the command structure,
the interests of which are directly represented by the prosecutor. While
the integrity of those who serve in a judicial capacity in military tribunals
may ensure that justice is done, efforts to establish objective conditions,
which ensure that justice also be seen to be done are relatively recent.
A. "Command Influence" in the United States
The issue of judicial independence is commonly referred to in
the United States as the problem of "command influence"'-"the mortal
enemy of military justice."63 Among the disturbing results of a U.S.
study mandated by the Military Justice Act of 1983,64 indicating that
"command influence" was far from a hypothetical threat, were "that
substantial numbers of judge advocates and military judges were aware
of instances in which judges had either been threatened with transfer
from judicial functions or actually transferred as a result of their
rulings."65 One recent case involved the entire court of the U.S. Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Military Review (NMCMR). 66  Having
unanimously overturned a conviction, the members of the NMCMR were
advised by the Inspector General of the Department of Defence that
"she had received an allegation that the decision ... had been affected by
'improper influence,' possibly in the form of exparte communications ...
[and] that 'bribery may have been involved'." 67 In the ensuing battle
over the prospect of the Inspector General's "intrud[ing] into the court's
deliberative process," 68 the Court filed a petition for extraordinary relief
from the USCMA. The uscMA granted the injunctive relief sought and
considered the gravity of the situation, saying:
63 U.S. v. Thomas, 22 M-J. 388 (USCMA 1986) at 393, as cited in Carlucci, supra note 8.
64 Supra note 53.
65 E.R. Fidell, "Military judges and military justice: the path to judicial independence" (1990)
74 Judicature 14 at 17 [hereinafter "Miltary judges"].
66 Carlucci, supra note 8.




Congress could hardly have intended that this court would be helpless to take action to
protect the independence and impartiality of military tribunals-which are essential in
assuring a servicemember's right to due process ... -when they were threatened by the
actions of civilians. Even more important, petitioner has alleged that the respondent
Inspector General seeks to accomplish her objective [the interview of the court to
examine its deliberative processes] by use of an order from a military superior to a
subordinate.69
In proposing measures to respond to this problem, one commentator
recommended a fixed term of office noting that "surely a system of
justice that today leaves judges insecure in their judicial office is a
remarkable anachronism,"7 0 and "[t]he fact that the current statutory
arrangement may withstand constitutional scrutiny does not mean that it
is sound public policy." 71
B. Judicial Independence in Canadian Courts Martial
Once civilian courts had resolved that ordinary standards of
fairness, including those related to judicial independence, applied to
courts martial, it remained to be established how the requirement of
judicial independence, or lack of it, might be applied. The 1985
Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Valente72 supplied the
necessary test and, in so doing, completed the foundation necessary for
the most profound challenge to the constitutionality of military
tribunals-that based on the section 11(d) Charter guarantee of judicial
independence. 7 3  In Valente, a decision which concerned the
independence of provincial court judges, Le Dain J., writing on behalf of
the entire Court, set three requirements for judicial independence:
security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence.74
With these requirements in hand, the CMAc embarked on its first serious
consideration of judicial independence in the September 1990 appeal in
6 9 Caruc4 supra note 8.
70 "Military judges," supra note 65 at 14.
71 lbiL at 17. Another measure recently instituted was the addition, by Congress, of article
6(a) to the Uniform Code of Military Justice which authorizes the President of the usCMA to
promulgate policies and procedures for investigating allegations against military trial and appellate
judges. Although this was apparently a response to the Carlucci case, it is not clear whether it forms
an adequate resolution of the problem.
72 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 [hereinafter Valente].
73 As anticipated by Heard in his 1988 article, supra note 31.
74 S upra note 72 at 694, 704 and at 708.
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R. v. Gindreux.75 Although the appeal was dismissed by a majority of two
to one in the CMAC, the powerful dissent by D~cary J.76 was followed,
within weeks, by the R. v. Ingebrigtson77 decision, which considered
judicial independence in the context of the Standing Court Martial
(scM). On behalf of a unanimous court, Mahoney C.J. reviewed the
structure and function of the SCM to determine its consistency with
section 11(d) and responded to two arguments put forward by the
respondent (the military) that had been persuasive in MacKay78 and
several subsequent CMAC decisions.
The first of these arguments, based on the majority and
concurring opinions of Ritchie and McIntyre JJ. in MacKay, claimed that
"the existence at the appeal level of a Court Martial Appeal Court was a
sufficient guarantee of the independence of military justice" 79 in
Canada. Mahoney C.J. swept this notion aside saying, "Similarly
dubious is the relevance of the existence of this Court, from which a
limited right of appeal lies, to the question whether Standing Courts
Martial are independent tribunals."8 0 The second argument was based
on the conflation of the requirements of impartiality and independence.
Distinguishing these requirements was critical because, as it had been
held in MacKay, challenging a court's impartiality requires a factual
basis,81 while challenging its independence requires only a review of the
75 (1990), [1992] 5 C.M.A.R. 38 [hereinafter Cnbireur (C.MA.C.)].
76 It is relatively rare for there to be dissent in the CMAC, and few decisions have been
supported by reasons as extensive as those found in Dcary J.'s dissent.
77 (1990), 5 C.M.A.R. 87 [hereinafter Ingebrigtson].
78 Supra note 43.
79 G&6reux (C.M.A.C.), supra note 75 at 83, Dcaxy J.
80lngebrigtson, supra note 77 at 96. In so doing, he echoed the sentiments of Dcaxy 3. that "it
would be, to say the least, extraordinary for an accused to be entitled to an independent tribunal
only if he is convicted and appeals the verdict against him!": G&6reux (C.M.A.C.), supra note 75 at
83.
81 In the cases of MacKay, supra note 43; Schick v. 1t (1987), 4 C.M.A.RL 540; Ared v. P.
(1987), 4 C.MA.1R 476; Goodwin v.R. (1988), 4 C.M.A.R. 527; andR v. Forster (1989), 5 C.M.A.R.
6, the courts held that the absence of evidence of impartiality was fatal to the appellants argument.
In one of the majority opinions, that of Mr. Justice Barbeau, in Gnreux (Cl.A.C.), supra note 75
at 52, it was held that "standing courts martial in Canada are independent tribunals and must be
regarded as such, unless in a particular given instance the record at trial discloses clear facts
establishing an absence of independence by such courts which may result from their activities or the
conduct of their members." This is not to say that appeals have never succeeded on the basis of
impartiality. In Lucas v.1R (1988), 4 C.M.A.R. 247, the intervention of the Judge Advocate was
considered a violation of the regulation requiring him to remain impartial at all times, the verdict
was overturned, and Corporal Lucas's rank was restored. Also in Twrgeon v. 1. (1988), 4 C.M.A.R
578 at 584, a decision that clearly anticipated Gnreux and Ingebrigtson, the Chief Justice held that
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legislation governing it.82 Mahoney C.J. adopted this approach, stating,
"The objective conditions and guarantees of judicial independence must
be provided to some extent by law and not only in practice."8 3
Having overcome the MacKay precedent, the Chief Justice
applied the three Valente requirements for judicial independence to the
most common form of court martial, the SCM, 84 concluding that there is
nothing in the present institutional arrangements vis-a-vis Standing Courts Martial that
offends s. 11(d). The deficiency lies entirely in inadequate security of tenure and
financial security. Given the present statutory framework which, it seems to me, could
accommodate a truly independent Judge Advocate General, it may be that appropriate
amendment of the Q.R.&O.'s could achieve the measure of judicial independence
constitutionally required to preserve a desirable judicial institution. 85
In the absence of submissions from the respondent concerning potential
justification on the basis of section 1 of the Charter, this was sufficient to
overturn Corporal Ingebrigtson's conviction and strike down the SCM.
the court was "not ... concerned with whether anything in fact prejudicial to the appellant occurred
during the off-the-record encounters between the Judge Advocate and members of the Court
Martial" because, following Clabby v. R. (1986), 4 C.MA.R. 397 at 399, "for the Judge Advocate to
retire with the Court Martial is as much a breach of the principles of fundamental justice as it would
be for a trial judge to retire with the jury."
82 As Le Dan J. had observed in Valente, supra note 72 at 685:
Although there is obviously a close relationship between independence and impartiality,
they are nevertheless separate and distinct values or requirements ... [Independence]
connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions,
but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of government,
that rests on objective conditions or guarantees.
And as Ddcary J. had said in Ggnoreux (C.M.A.C.), supra note 75 at 59, "Legislative and
regulatory provisions speak for themselves and if they areprima facie an infringement of the rights
guaranteed by the Charter, no further evidence is necessary."
83 Ingebrigtson, supra note 77 at 98.
84 The sCM, described by Mahoney CJ., ibid. at 91, as "a relatively recent creation of Canadian
law," has existed since the Second World War to try offences committed in Canada. Unlike the
General Court Martial (,cM), its jurisdiction is restricted to those of the rank of Sergeant and
below;, and, unlike the Disciplinary Court Martial, it has jurisdiction to try all offences. (The fourth
type of Court Martial, the Special General Court Martial is convened to try civilians subject to
military law, such as dependents living on overseas bases.) The scM also differs in that it is presided
over by a single, legally trained officer who is appointed to the position on an ongoing basis and sits
routinely, rather than on an occasional basis: see ibid. at 91-92.
85lngebnigtson,supra note 77 at 108. "QR&O" stands for Queen's Regulations and Orders for
the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, looseleaf). These regulations amplify the National
Defence.Act.
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C. The Creation of an Independent Military Judiciary
Within weeks, amendments to the QR&O regulations governing
courts martial were instituted by the Governor-in-Council to reinstate
the SCM in accordance with the requirements of security of tenure and
financial independence that had been held to be lacking in Ingebrigtson.
The significant changes, applying to officers performing judicial duties in
all four types of courts martial, established them as "military trial
judges," and sought to satisfy the requirements for judicial independence
as follows:
security of tenure:
a) the requirement of a fixed term: article 4.09(2);
b) the requirement that military trial judges not perform any other
duties during that term: article 4.09(4);
c) the prohibition of termination of the appointment except at the
written request of the officer, upon his/her promotion, the
commencement of retirement leave based on age or voluntary
release, or for cause: article 4.09(6);
d) the prohibition of release from the services except voluntarily or
upon reaching retirement age: article 15.01(6); and
e) extensive regulations for the conduct of "Inquiries Concerning
Officers Performing Judicial Duties" necessary to show cause for
terminating an appointment: articles 101.13-16.
financial independence (and career advancement):
a) the elimination of personal reports and assessments that
normally form the basis for promotions, training, posting, and
pay decisions, for the duration of the term, and the prohibition
of any consideration of the performance as a judge on any
subsequent reports: articles 26.10-11; and
b) the establishment of rates of pay equal to the maximum of the
annual range for a legal officer of the same rank and a
percentage premium 2 per cent higher than the latest merit pay
percentage increase paid to a legal officer of the same rank:
articles 204.18 & 204.22.
All in all, these amendments provide that, for the fixed term,
normally of four years but not less than two years, officers holding
military trial judge positions are sheltered from concerns that might
affect the performance of their duties in an otherwise thoroughly
hierarchical context. In theory, the only form of "command influence"
that could affect the conduct of a military judge would be the promise of
a promotion which would itself have to be independently justified, and
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which according to the regulations also would form the basis for a
possible termination of the appointment.
V. THE MATTER RESOLVED?: THE 1992 SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA DECISIONS
With an awareness of the groundwork established by the
jurisprudence leading up to the 1992 decisions in Gdndreux (S.C.C.) and
R. v. Forster,8 6 it may be difficult on first reading to discern the
jurisprudential achievements made beyond the conference of Supreme
Court approval on the earlier CMAc judgments in Gdndreux and
Ingebrigtson and the QR&O amendments that followed. Closer
examination reveals, however, the interest on the part of the majority of
the Supreme Court to clarify certain conceptions regarding the nature of
the court martial and to put certain lingering issues to rest. Therefore,
although reviewing these issues requires retracing our steps somewhat, it
is important to distinguish the issues that may bear fruit in future
litigation from those the Court would have us regard as non-starters.
First, speaking for the majority, Lamer C.J. adopted the
reasoning of Wilson J. in Wigglesworth on the applicability of section 11
of the Charter87 as follows:
86 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 339 [hereinafter Forster]. Forster was a companion decision to Ginfreux
(S.C.C.) with respect to the structural consistency of the GCM with the requirements of s. 11(d) of
the Charter. However, its unusual facts emphasize the distinction between the institutional and
occupational models of civil-military relations (Moskos, supra note 33), creating a virtual conflict of
laws. The dispute between then Major Forster and the military began with her consultation with a
civilian lawyer following a disagreement with a superior. Her superior reassigned her in a way that
she and her lawyer considered to be a "constructive dismissal," and she tried to tender a
"resignation." However, since departure from the services can only be effected through the
"release" procedure, her resignation was of no effect; when she failed to report for duty at her
posting, she was charged with being "absent without leave." At the Supreme Court level, she
argued that she did not have the requisite mens rea for the offence; however, this argument was
rejected because the mistake was one of law and not one of fact, and so could not excuse her
actions.
8 7 The supremacy of the Charter is established in s. 52(1), supra note 28. Its applicability to the
dictates of the executive branch of government is derived from s. 32(1), which reads: "This Charter
applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority
of Parliament ..." (emphasis added]; see Retai4 Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v.
Dolphin Delivey Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 592-604; and Operation Dismantle, supra note 17. The
only express exception to the application of the Charter to military law is contained in s. 11(f), which
reads: "Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (f) except in the case of an offence
under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of trial byjury..." The existence of
the exception of s. 11(f) has been cited as indicating that the Charters application to military law
was contemplated and intended by its drafters.
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Although the Code of Service Discipline is primarily concerned with maintaining
discipline and integrity in the Canadian Armed Forces, it does not serve merely to
regulate conduct that undermines such discipline and integrity. The Code serves a public
function as well by punishing specific conduct which threatens public order and welfare.
Many of the offences with which an accused may be charged ... relate to matters which
are of a public nature ...
In any event, the appellant faced the possible penalty of imprisonment in this case ...
therefore, s. 11 of the Charter would nonetheless apply by virtue of the potential
imposition of true penal consequences.88
In short, courts empowered to function as criminal courts of law should
be subject to the same rigorous standards as those courts.
The Chief Justice then considered the serious implications of
Wigglesworth on the possibility of finding support in the Charter for the
existence of a court system in addition to the ordinary courts.
Specifically, he posed the question of whether "a parallel system of
military tribunals, staffed by members of the military who are aware of
and sensitive to military concerns, [is] by its very nature inconsistent with
s. 11(d) of the Charter?"8 9 It is worth noting that, despite the appellant's
conceding this point, the Court thought it necessary to record its findings
on this question, thus indicating its determination to put this matter to
rest. It is also worth noting that, posed in this way, the question lifted
the analysis, once and for all, out of the administrative law context and
placed it in the sphere of criminal lawY In this context, the stakes were
much higher: if the court martial survived, it would have to be as a full-
fledged criminal court and not as an administrative tribunal with a
Despite the lack of constitutional impediment to judicial review of court martial decisions and
the express provision in s. 18 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, for prerogative relief for
appeals from courts martial, there has been, until recently, a great reluctance on the part of the
Federal Court to grant such relief from decisions of courts martial. Dickson J. (as he then was) in
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No.2), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 at 624-28, held that
there was a "disciplinary exemption" for courts martial from the issuance of writs of certiorari in the
traditional view, but that this was not a rule of law. Reed J. of the Federal Court Trial Division
furthered this trend in Schick v. A-G. (Canada) [1986], 5 F.T.R. 82, by finding that judicial review
was available for the decisions of courts martial.
88 Gnireux (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 281-82.
89 Ibid. at 288 [emphasis in original].
90 The drafting of s. 11 of the Charter supports this approach. Containing rights relating to
"proceedings in criminal and penal matters," it may serve to inform the content of the "principles of
fundamental justice" and so assist in the interpretation of s. 7 in an administrative law context, but is
not directly applicable to administrative proceedings. The express consideration of military
tribunals in s. 11(f) suggests that the section is intended otherwise to be applicable to proceedings
under military law, which in turn, indicates that the framers of the Charter intended the court
martial to maintain judicial standards. In other words, the Charter requirements for criminal
proceedings may be contextualized in their application to courts martial, but they are not "flexible"
in the administrative law sense.
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specialized jurisdiction to which the courts would be prepared to make
significant concessions to efficiency and variations in context.91 These,
however, were the battle lines that the respondent would have the courts
draw. In light of the greatly expanded requirements for fairness in
public law, the extensive and swiftly implemented amendments to the
regulations following Ingebrigison indicate that the Legal Branch of the
Canadian Forces wished to improve the procedural fairness of courts
martial so that they could be compared favourably with the ordinary
courts.92 If the court martial could meet with approval in this regard, it
might escape relegation to the role of a disciplinary tribunal suggested in
the concurring decision of Stevenson J. and the limited scope that would
entail.
Satisfaction of the Charter's stringent requirements for
procedural fairness, however, as the Chief Justice went on to suggest,
would not itself justify the existence of a parallel system of courts.
Justification would have to be sought in the purpose of such a system.
"91 It should be noted that the various types of court martial comprise only the most formal of a
range of proceedings operating to maintain discipline in the military. The extent to which the duty
of fairness applies to, and is presently afforded in, the many forms of summary proceedings is
examined in Watkin, supra note 34.
92 The influence of the make-up of the "military bar" should not be overlooked. Rowe's
reference earlier to the extensive involvement of laypersons in U.K. courts martial can be contrasted
with Fidell's examination of the U.S. military bar which is comprised largely of lawyers who receive
their training through the military and whose practice is, of necessity, exclusively within the military
justice system. In his 1989 article, supra note 12 at 127, Fidell spoke of the
gap that separates civilian and military societies and defines their views of one another
and of their respective legal systems. 'Hatred' is certainly too strong a term for the
relationship, but would 'mutual distrust' do? Anyone who has practiced in both
communities would have to acknowledge the accuracy of such a description. Worse yet
there is little prospect for bridging this gap so long as our society is content to treat the
military as a separate society.
Consequently,
[a]nyone tracing the path of military law over the last several decades will be struck by
two phenomena: the extent of change that has overtaken the system ... and the resistance
to change. Much of the change has been justified-or condemned-under the rubric of
'civilianization'-the 'C word,' mere utterance of which still makes the occasional senior
military lawyer see red. (Tbhi at 125.)
- When resistance to law reform becomes an entrenched goal of the practising bar, it creates
enormous, if not insuperable, barriers to constitutional reform. A third model can be found in the
Legal Branch of the Canadian Armed Forces which, comprised of officers with civilian training, has
proven to be a moving force in the area of law reform. Articles and theses such as those of Fay,
infra note 95, and Watkin, supra note 34, have included extensive recommendations for reform of
military law and procedure and have had significant impact on amendments to the regulations
governing the Forces. It is noteworthy that these endeavours were supported by the military as
integral to these legal officers' career development.
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This purpose would, in turn, "provide guides as to the system's proper
limits."g After reviewing the jurisprudence and academic literature, the
Chief Justice concluded that the maintenance of discipline and morale in
the Forces depends on an efficient judicial system sensitive to context in
determining the seriousness of the infraction and the appropriate
severity of the punishment.94 Moreover, as was suggested by Fay nearly
two decades earlier, in his study of military law,95 confidence in the
ability of the court martial to satisfy these requirements is itself
enhanced by the fact that those taking part in courts martial are
themselves members of the Forces. In Fay's words,
A major strength of the present military judicial system rests in the use of trained military
officers, who are also legal officers, to sit on courts martial in judicial roles. If this
connection were to be severed, (and true independence could only be achieved by such
severance), the advantage of independence of the judge that might thereby be achieved
would be more than offset by the disadvantage of the eventual loss by the judge of the
military knowledge and experience which today helps him to meet his responsibilities
effectively. Neither the Forces nor the accused would benefit from such a separation.96
While the existence of a separate system of justice staffed by military
personnel is necessary to the discipline and morale of the forces, neither
this purpose, nor the practical requirements97 of a separate system
necessitate or justify standards of fairness or procedural safeguards
inferior to those of civilian courts. The misconception that military
discipline is achieved through fear of the arbitrariness of court martial
proceedings or the inevitability of its verdicts was also corrected by Fay,
who wrote:
Fairness and justice are indispensable ... When the serviceman has confidence in his
commanders and believes in the organization, there is discipline ... It is from military law
that the serviceman receives his most tangible indication of the relationship between
himself and those who command. It is under military law that he is tried and punished.
If the military law system is a just system, then it will be recognized as such by the
93 Gbereux (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 288.
94 For example, in civilian life, the striking of a stranger may well incur liability for assault,
whereas in the military, blows struck off duty between members of similar rank may be overlooked
in the absence of injury, though the very act of a member of the ranks striking an officer or vice-
versa may warrant a relatively severe punishment.
95 J.B. Fay, "Canadian Military Criminal Law: An Examination of Military Justice" (1975) 23
Chitty's Li. 120,156, 195, 228.
9 6 Ibid. at 248.
97 For example, efficiency, the ability to recognize and gauge an infraction, and the ability to
discern the appropriate sentence.
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serviceman and thus it will promote and support the discipline upon which the military
organization is based.98
Having laid the groundwork for the review of the General Court
Martial, the Chief Justice distinguished MacKay, saying that the MacKay
Court had applied a "subjective test" to determine the tribunal's actual
bias whereas, since Valente, the objective question of judicial
independence had to be posed separately as it was in this case.9 Having
conceded the impartiality of the Judge Advocate present at his court
martial, Private G~ntreux, nevertheless, was able to challenge the
independence of the GCM because, as the Chief Justice explained,
the question of independence, in contrast, extends beyond the subjective attitude of the
decision-maker. The independence of a tribunal is a matter of its status.... The
appropriate question is whether the tribunal, from the objective standpoint of a
reasonable and informed person, will be perceived as enjoying the essential conditions of
independence.10 0
A. Valente Applied
On applying the first of the Valente criteria for judicial
independence, security of tenure, Lamer C.J. held that
Unlike the situation of the ordinary courts, a judge advocate is appointed to sit on a
General Court Martial on an ad hoc basis ... At the conclusion of this type of court
martial, the judge advocate and members return to their usual roles within the military...
there was no objective guarantee that his or her career as military judge would not be
affected by decisions tending in favour of an accused rather than the prosecution.101
Noting that the principle of security of tenure admitted a certain
flexibility, the Chief Justice considered the alternatives of finding the
court martial a "specific adjudicative task" for which the existing
arrangement was adequate, and of requiring "tenure until retirement
during good behaviour equivalent to that enjoyed by judges of the
regular criminal courts."102 On the former it was held that "[a]lthough a
General Court Martial is convened on an ad hoc basis, it is not a 'specific
adjudicative task'. The General Court Martial is a recurring affair.
Military judges who act periodically as judge advocates must therefore
9 8 Fay, supra note 95 at 123.
99 In Gin reux (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 289, Lamer CJ. also noted that this appeal concerned
an infringement of the Charter rather than its predecessor, the Bll oflPghts.
100 Ibid. at 283 and at 287.
101 ibid at 302-03.
102 IbMd at 304.
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have a tenure that is beyond the interference of the executive for a fixed
period of time."103 On the latter, it was noted that
[o]fficers who serve as militaiy judges are members of the military establishment, and will
probably not wish to be cut off from promotional opportunities within that career system.
It would not therefore be reasonable to require a system in which military judges are
appointed until the age of retirement. 104
One interesting point is that the relationship between the issues
of security of tenure and financial independence in the context of the
court martial tend to merge in the question of security with respect to
career advancement. Tenure to a military judge is not so much a
concern for job security as it is one for the risk of displeasing superiors
and so being passed over for promotions and desirable postings. 105
Similarly, financial security is not a special concern except to the extent
that some of the smaller incremental increases may be made available
through a good showing on the periodic Performance Evaluation
Report.
On the question of financial security, the Court observed:
There were no formal prohibitions, at the time that the appellant was tried by the
General Court Martial, against evaluating an officer on the basis of his or her
performance at a General Court Martial .. Consequently, by granting or denying a salary
increase or bonus on the basis of a performance evaluation, the executive might
effectively reward or punish an officer for his or her performance as a member of a
General Court Martial.106
On both these issues, the Chief Justice noted that the amendments to
the regulations that had been implemented in the intervening period
were sufficient to correct the problem.
Finally, with regard to institutional independence which the
Ingebrigison Court had not found lacking in the court martial, Chief
Justice Lamer found that
military officers, who are responsible to their superiors in the Department of Defence,
are intimately involved in the proceedings of the tribunal. This close involvement ...
103 biU at 303.
104 ibid. at 304.
105 This helps to explain the insistence on the part of the minority of the Court that the court
martial was a "specific adjudicative task" for which there was sufficient tenure in the old regulations.
This view seems to overlook the situation that arises more with the sco when a trained legal officer
presides routinely over the court martial and is required by the regulations to be the subject of
periodic performance evaluation. l the officer's work during the preceding period for evaluation
had included many assignments to courts martial, then the regulations had required the officer's
performance as ajudge to be evaluated.
106 Ginreux (S.C.C), supra note 2 at 306.
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undermines the notion of institutional independence ... The idea of a separate system of
military tribunals obviously requires substantial relations between the military hierarchy
and the military judicial system. The principle of institutional independence, however,
requires that the General Court Martial be free from external interference with respect
to matters that relate directly to the tribunal's judicial function ... It is not acceptable, in
my opinion, that the convening authority, i.e., the executive, who is responsible for
appointing the prosecutor, also have the authority to appoint members of the court
martial, who serve as the triers of fact1
0 7
This finding necessitated a further amendment to article 111.23 of the
QR&O. However, it was noted that the difficulty caused by the
appointment of the judge advocate by the judge advocate general had
been remedied in the 1991 amendments to the QR&O.
Although this application of the Valente criteria may have had
salutary effects on the objectively appraised independence of the court
martial, its preoccupation with the independence of the judge advocate
to the exclusion of the panel of military personnel comprising the court
martial itself should not be accepted uncritically. The respective roles of
judge advocate and court martial differ significantly from those of judge
and jury in an ordinary criminal court. In the General Court Martial, for
example, the court martial consists of between five and nine members10 8
and is charged with the responsibilities both of determining guilt or
innocence by a majority vote and of determining sentence.1°9 One of its
members, acting as President of the court,110 ensures the proper conduct
of the trial and the proper performance of the duties of the court,111 and
is empowered to direct the judge advocate to rule on questions of law or
of mixed law and fact.1 12 Although the judge advocate's rulings on
matters of law and procedure can only be disregarded "for very weighty
reasons"113 and, as a practical matter, deference is shown to both the
judge advocate's broad legal training and specialized military
qualifications, the judge advocate requires the leave of the President to
address the members of the court martial. Recognition of the special
role of the court martial and its President in military trials has warranted
10 7 1bid. at 308-09.
108 NationalDefenceAct, supra note 32, s. 167; QR&O, art. 111.18.
109 NationalDefenceAct, supra note 32, s. 192.
110 Ibid. s. 168.
111 QR&O, art. 112.54.
112 National Defence Act, supra note 32, s. 192(4).
113 QR&O, art. 112.54.
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restrictions on eligibility to sit on a court martial 14 in addition to the
right of the defendant to object to the selection of any member of the
Court. Whether these safeguards are sufficient to secure the
independence of the court martial was not considered by the Supreme
Court as a result of its exclusive focus on the judicial role of the judge
advocate. It will be interesting to see if the court martial or its President
become the subject of future debate on the question of judicial
independence.
In addressing the possibility that the legislation could be saved
under section 1 as a reasonable limit on the right to a hearing by an
independent tribunal, Lamer C.J. held that a violation of section 11(d)
"will only pass the second arm of the proportionality test in Oakes115 in
the most extraordinary of circumstances ... [such as] ... a period of war or
insurrection." 116 The GCM failed, in the case of Corporal G~nereux's
trial, to impair his rights as little as possible and so could not be justified
by section 1. This finding is significant in that it established that the
formal independence of a military judiciary, in spite of the dearth of
foreign examples, is a necessity in a free and democratic society.
114 The following persons are prohibited, under s. 170 of theAct, from sitting as a member of
a General Court Martial: the officer who convened the court martial; the prosecutor, a witness for
the prosecution; the commanding officer of the accused person; a provost officer, and any person
who was involved in the investigation with respect to the charge in question. The members of a
General Court Martial should not normally be of a rank lower than that held by the accused (art.
111.21 (Note A) QR&O). No members of the court martial can be below the rank of captain (s.
170(g) of the Act). The President cannot be below the rank of colonel (s. 168(1) of the Act). In
addition, the members of the Court should not be selected from the unit to which the accused
belongs unless the demands of the military require otherwise (art. 111.06 (Note B) QR&O).
Gbnlreux (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 308.
115 1. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. The test outlines the doctrine developed to determine
justification for Charter infringements under s. 1. Watkin, supra note 34, makes an argument similar
to that which might be offered on behalf of aspects of military justice held to violate the Charter in
the context of summary proceedings. As he suggests, disruption of the life of an accused by judicial
proceedings in the case of a defendant serving in the armed forces is disruptive of the service itself
and so it is better to enhance the procedural fairness of military tribunals than to tailor service
members' activities to accommodate attendance at civilian proceedings. Moreover, unless a
'service connection" test was used with a presumption in favour of military tribunal jurisdiction, it
would tend to fragment and disrupt discipline which, in part, depends upon the recognition of
service tribunal authority over service personnel.
116 Gdnreux (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 313 [footnote added].
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B. The Context of Military Necessity
Lest it be thought that this major overhaul of the court martial
had proceeded too smoothly, brief reference should be made to the
dissent by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. who felt that the majority had accorded
insufficient weight to the "context." Adequate attention to the context,
she argued, would generate "a concern for flexibility and a recognition
that differences in tribunals form an acceptable and even desirable part
of the Canadian legal landscape"117-differences that cast doubt on the
applicability of the Valente criteria to courts martial. Elaborating on this
approach, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. disagreed with each of the findings
pertaining to the three criteria for judicial independence and concluded
that the appellants' constitutional rights had not been violated.
Surprising as it may seem to read a dissent in a dispute that had
largely been abated by the respondent's previous amendments to the
regulations governing the court martial, it is worth considering briefly
the impetus for such a view and its possible consequences. Military law
shares a good deal with public law, and viewed in that context there may
be a tendency to accord the deference to "military necessity" that one
would accord to administrative exigencies in the delivery of government
programmes. However, if administrative tribunals exist on a continuum
from those in which the barest minimum requirements satisfy the duty of
fairness through to those with ever greater proximity to courts of law,
then it was suggested by the majority in Gdndreux, and it is strenuously
urged here, that the court martial does not exist within this continuum.
It is not an administrative tribunal that resembles a court. It is a court.
Accordingly, the debate over curial deference to the specialized
expertise that has engaged the Supreme Court of Canada in recent
years118 is of minimal application in the context of the court martial.
Moreover, to the extent that the context of military necessity requires
deference, it is not a context in which the maintenance of discipline and
morale call for, or even permit, the compromise of the essential
procedural requirements for fairness that are available in a civilian court.
While the staffing of a tribunal with those able to appreciate the
ll71bid. at 328.
118 See Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Syndicat des employos de production du Quibec et de l'Acadie v. Canada Labour
Relations Board, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; CAIMAW
v. Paccar of Canada Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada Import
Tribunal, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; and Lester (W.W ) (1978) Ltd, v. United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefltting Industy, Local 740, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644.
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significance of various breaches of the Code of Service Discipline and the
punishment appropriate to them is a military necessity, it is equally
necessary that the fairness of the proceedings continue to enjoy the
respect of those subject to them. If there is a special contextual concern
in military justice it is with the good reputation of its administration. 1 9
The risk to the respondent of the appeal in Gbn6reux had little to do with
the possibility of an enhanced administrative burden; it had to do with
the possibility of being characterized, as suggested in the concurring
decision of Stevenson J., as a professional disciplinary tribunal and
experiencing the reduced jurisdiction appropriate to such bodies.
Ironically, the majority decision that allowed the appeal and
identified many constitutional inconsistencies represented a victory for
the military. It indicated a confidence on the part of the judiciary, as
defenders of the Constitution, that justice could be both done and seen
to be done within, and not in spite of, the distinct context of the court
martial. With the necessary amendments swiftly enacted, the Gdndreux
and Forster decisions resulted in a remarkable "win-win" situation for
military defendants and the military itself in Canada.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE PATH AHEAD
Of the two propositions with which we began-that the rule of
law required the existence of effective armed forces for its maintenance,
and that military discipline required that service personnel be denied its
benefits-it is clearly the former that, in Canada, has been the more
commonly questioned. However, the recent Supreme Court of Canada
rulings indicate that the latter has finally come to be widely recognized
as the less secure.
That military discipline must be perceived to be fair in order to
promote discipline and support morale is neither new nor remarkable.
The requirements for perceived fairness, however, are a different
matter. In the 1950s and 1960s, the existence of civilian appellate review
seemed to suffice. In the 1970s and 1980s, the emphasis on formal
equality and the equation of soldier with citizen, and military service
with civilian occupations, suggested that fairness required a narrow
construction of the role and scope of courts martial. In the 1990s,
however, the emergence of new visions of equality is permitting the
recognition of the possibility that justice may be done even in a court
system outside that of ordinary criminal courts.
1 19 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Have the decisions in Gindreux and Forster and the amendments
to the structure of the court martial they required established the
fairness of military tribunals once and for all? Assuredly not. Evolving
standards for procedural fairness in both the civilian and military context
will undoubtedly form the basis for fresh challenges to the military
justice system. It is likely that challenges to the severity of
punishments,120 which to date have met with little success, will continue
to be launched as will challenges addressing issues arising in the context
of summary discipline proceedings, which constitute the overwhelming
majority of military proceedings.
This article began by observing the good fortune of Canadians to
have long enjoyed peace, and it concludes by observing the good fortune
to have the constitutional and jurisprudential resources to resolve
conflicts between the military justice system and the constitutional rights
of defendants within it in a principled way in accordance with the courts'
"mandated responsibility for judicial review."121 The existence of stated
constitutional standards and the absence of sharp divisions between the
executive and the judiciary in Canada have established a unique
opportunity and structure for judicial review; and the creation of an
independent judiciary within the military, endorsed by the Supreme
Court in the Gdnreux and Forster decisions, has demonstrated firm
support for the furtherance of fundamental justice in courts martial.
The path from regarding military justice as an oxymoron to regarding
procedural fairness as a genuine aspiration of the court martial system in
common law countries may be neither short, nor well travelled, but it is
one along which the Canadian military justice system, at last, seems well
equipped to lead the way.
120 For example, R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, suggests that convictions which may
stigmatize the offender may require greater procedural safeguards at trial than those which do not
in order to be constitutional. Reduction in rank, which, among a great many other things, clearly
involves significant adverse effects on one's reputation and position in the military community may
form the basis for challenging the legislation.
121 Operation Dismantle, supra note 17.
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